Editorial of Special issue “Industrial Organisation of the Health Sector and Public Policy” by Chalkley, Martin John et al.
This is a repository copy of Editorial of Special issue “Industrial Organisation of the Health 
Sector and Public Policy”.
White Rose Research Online URL for this paper:
http://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/106006/
Version: Accepted Version
Article:
Chalkley, Martin John orcid.org/0000-0002-1091-8259, Cremer, Helmuth and Siciliani, 
Luigi orcid.org/0000-0003-1739-7289 (2016) Editorial of Special issue “Industrial 
Organisation of the Health Sector and Public Policy”. Journal of health economics. pp. 
256-257. ISSN 0167-6296 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jhealeco.2016.09.010
eprints@whiterose.ac.uk
https://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/
Reuse 
This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 
(CC BY-NC-ND) licence. This licence only allows you to download this work and share it with others as long 
as you credit the authors, but you can’t change the article in any way or use it commercially. More 
information and the full terms of the licence here: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/ 
Takedown 
If you consider content in White Rose Research Online to be in breach of UK law, please notify us by 
emailing eprints@whiterose.ac.uk including the URL of the record and the reason for the withdrawal request. 
Accepted Manuscript 
 
 
Title: (GLWRULDORI6SHFLDOLVVXH³,QGXVWULDO2UJDQLVDWLRQRIWKH+HDOWK6HFWRU
DQG3XEOLF3ROLF\´ 
 
Author: Martin Chalkley, Helmuth Cremer, Luigi Siciliani 
 
PII:  S0167-6296(16)30282-X 
DOI:  http://dx.doi.org/doi: 10.1016/j.jhealeco.2016.09.010 
Reference: JHE 1973 
 
To appear in: Journal of Health Economics 
 
 
 
Please cite this article as:  Martin Chalkley, Helmuth Cremer, Luigi Siciliani, Editorial of Special 
LVVXH³,QGXVWULDO2UJDQLVDWLRQRIWKH+HDOWK6HFWRUDQG3XEOLF3ROLF\´, Journal of Health 
Economics (2016), http://dx.doi.org/doi: 10.1016/j.jhealeco.2016.09.010. 
 
This is a PDF file of an unedited manuscript that has been accepted for publication.  As a service 
to our customers we are providing this early version of the manuscript.  The manuscript will 
undergo copyediting, typesetting, and review of the resulting proof before it is published in its 
final form.  Please note that during the production process errors may be discovered which could 
affect the content, and all legal disclaimers that apply to the journal pertain. 
 
 
Editorial of Special issue  
³,QGXVWULDO2UJDQLVDWLRQRIWKH+HDOWK6HFWRUDQG3XEOLF3ROLF\´ 
Martin Chalkley    Helmuth Cremer    Luigi Siciliani 
 
This special issue includes a selection of papers presented at the 16th European Health 
Economics Workshop held in Toulouse on the 28-29 May 2015. The special issue focuses on 
microeconomic theoretical models in health economics, with a strong emphasis on applications 
of industrial organization, contract theory and public economics. The common aim is to address 
and answer key policy questions through rigorous and formal analyses.  
The papers address specific issues and interventions in relation to nutritional policies, regulation 
of the pharmaceutical industry, long-term care and the role of incentive schemes in stimulating 
healthcare provision. Both normative and positive approaches are employed.   
 
Nutritional policies  
Cremer, Goulão and Roeder investigate the determination of fat taxes within a political economy 
(median voter) approach, under a general model where individuals differ both in income and the 
degree of misperception of the long-run health effects concerning the consumption of fat and 
healthy goods. Tax revenues are used (earmarked) to reduce health insurance premiums or to 
finance a subsidy on the healthy good. They find that the fat tax determined through the political 
process is generally too low (or lower compared to a fat tax chosen by a utilitarian policymaker). 
The earmarking rule can be used to boost the political support for the fat tax, but this may 
involve a trade-off between the fat tax and a subsidy for a healthy good. 
Requillart, Soler and Zang investigate how firms strategically react to nutritional policies when 
there is product differentiation and individuals differ in both the preferences for a good and its 
healthy content. They compare three policies: a minimum quality standard, an excise tax on the 
nutrient content of the unhealthy product, and an excise tax on the nutrient content of all 
products. They find that the first two policies dominate the third one, and that the choice between 
the first two depends on the relative importance of the taste parameter.  
 
Regulation of Pharmaceuticals  
Gonzalez, Macho-Stadler and Perez-Castrillo investigate whether pharmaceutical companies 
have adequate incentives to invest in research and development of breakthrough and follow-on 
drugs. They study the price decision of a firm introducing a new drug, and analyze the firm's 
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incentives to invest in R&D when a pioneer drug is already on the market. They show that while 
private and social incentives to invest in R&D processes coincide for incremental innovation 
ventures, private incentives are lower than social ones when the process is radical. Consequently, 
firms invest too many resources in research activity of follow-on drugs with only incremental 
innovation.  
Jobjornsson, Forster, Pertile and Burman study the incentives for a pharmaceutical company to 
invest in research and development under uncertainty on the willingness to pay from the payer. 
They show that the effect of lower uncertainty is in general indeterminate. For low and high 
levels of uncertainty, prices and incentives to invest go in the same direction: if price goes up 
(down) so does the incentive to innovate. For intermediate levels of uncertainty, lower 
uncertainty reduces prices, increases profits and stimulates investments, therefore benefitting 
patients, the insurer and the firm.  
Brekke, Canta and Straume study the effect of reference pricing on competition between generics 
and brand-name producers, and entry of generics producers. The reference price specifies a 
maximum reimbursement for a category of drugs with therapeutic similar effects. They show that 
reference pricing might induce brand-name producers to price more aggressively, which in turn 
might discourage generics entry. Contrary to expectations, reference pricing might not reduce 
expenditure. This does not arise under price cap regulation which instead always stimulates entry 
of generic producers.  
 
Long term care  
Cremer, Lozachmeur and Pestiau investigate the design of the optimal insurance contract for 
long term care in the presence of ex post moral hazard, when informal care, can be provided by 
family members. The study shows that the optimal coinsurance rate is generally higher (the 
reimbursement rate is lower) than in a standard insurance model, and this is due to the potential 
crowding out of informal care.  
Ponthiere and Pestieau consider the incentives for timing of births in regard to long-term care. 
Individuals make choices regarding when to have children anticipating that their children can 
provide care for them in later life. However, individuals are typically myopic, incorrectly 
anticipate the incentives that their children will face when adults and do not take account of their 
decisions on the overall structure of the population. In an overlapping generations model it is 
shown that there will be a tendency to delay births too long and that this inefficiently reduces the 
future supply of long-term care. There is thus a role for public policy in encouraging earlier 
parenthood.  
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Incentive schemes for healthcare provision 
Barigozzi and Burani derive the optimal payment schemes (eg a basic wage and a bonus) for 
health workers, when a for-profit and a non-profit hospital compete. Health workers differ in 
both ability and intrinsic motivation and these are private information. They show that motivated 
workers tend to provide more care and are paid less, and that allocative distortions decrease with 
the degree of competition.  
Brekke, Levaggi, Siciliani and Straume study the effect of cross-border patient mobility across 
countries (or regions) and its effects on quality incentives when transfers across countries are 
based on pricing of the Diagnosis Related Groups type, and income varies both within and across 
countries. They show that facilitating mobility thorough simpler administrative procedures may 
have an adverse effect on the quality of some countries, and there is therefore scope for refining 
current transfer arrangements.  
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